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1. Introduction. 
 
This paper analyses the effect of union bargaining power on wages and employment in a labor 
market where single firms are faced with an upward sloping labor supply curve. Conventional 
wage bargaining models assume that without union bargaining power, the outcome occurs at 
the competitive solution where demand and supply of labor is equalized, and firms move up 
their labor demand curve as union bargaining power increases. In this paper, we take a 
different approach and assume that the relevant reference point is the monopsony solution and 
formalizes the idea that the bargaining solution can be on the supply schedule. The idea that 
firms may have some wage-setting power has wide appeal both from an empirical and 
theoretical point of view, see Manning (2003) for a comprehensive discussion. In addition to 
the textbook local labor market monopsony model, an upward sloping labor supply curve 
towards individual firms can be explained by search frictions of various forms in the labor 
market.  
 
A large empirical literature has documented that unions increase wages, see for example 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2002). While some discussion has existed on the actual magnitude 
of the union wage gap, there is considerable agreement that a positive union wage differential 
exists. However, a much smaller literature has been devoted to the empirical investigation of 
union employment effects. The findings in Blanchflower et al. (1991), Leonard (1992) and 
Wooden and Hawke (2000) indicate that unionism hurt employment growth, while the 
evidence in Machin and Wadhwani (1991) is quite mixed. DiNardo and Lee (2002) estimates 
small union impact on employment, with large standard errors. Other studies claim that 
empirical evidence on wage-employment outcomes are consistent with the view that unions 
have bargaining power over employment, see for example Alogoskoufis and Manning (1991) 
and de la Croix et al. (1996). Further, several studies find insignificant or positive union 
employment effects in the local public sector, see for example Valetta (1993) and the review 
of Gregory and Borland (1999). The conclusion in Pencavel (1991) seems still to be valid: 
“At the moment, the evidence regarding the effect of unionism on employment is not only 
meagre, but also quite inconclusive” (p. 44).  
 
The lack of robust evidence on the union effect on employment is puzzling. At least three 
different explanations of a positive association between employment and unionism have been 
suggested. First, efficient bargaining theory suggests that the bargaining outcome is on a 
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contract curve that can be positively sloped in wage-employment space [McDonald and 
Solow (1981)]. The main argument against this kind of models is that one rarely observes 
bargaining over both employment and wages; most real world union contracts specify wage 
rates, not employment levels. Second, some authors have suggested that employment-wage 
outcomes are on the labor demand curve, but that unions induce a positive shift in the firms’ 
labor demand. If these shifts are of significant size, even a positive association between 
employment and unionism can arise. This argument has been particularly popular in 
explaining findings of positive union employment effects in the public sector [Zax and 
Ichniowski (1988), Valetta (1993)]. Evidence for such effects is found by Chandler and Gely 
(1995) and Marlow and Orzechowski (1996).1 In addition, Manning (2003) has recently 
noticed that under monopsony employment rises along the supply curve as the union increases 
the wage from a low level. 
 
We develop a wage bargaining model with the pure monopsony and pure monopoly union 
models as special cases, and analyze how wage and employment outcomes depend on the 
relative bargaining power of the bargaining parties. Since the labor supply curve is upward 
sloping, the workers must be heterogeneous in some respect. Our specification of the labor 
supply function based on heterogeneity in workers’ alternative income is in line with the 
model formulation of Bulkley and Myles (2001) who consider union behavior within a model 
where the outcome is restricted to be on the demand curve.  
 
The model allows us to distinguish between three possible outcomes of higher relative firm 
bargaining power. The conventional demand constrained regime where higher firm bargaining 
power reduces wages and increases employment occurs when the bargaining power is below a 
certain lower critical level. On the other hand, a supply constrained regime where increased 
firm bargaining power reduces both wages and employment occurs when the bargaining 
power is above an upper critical level. Manning (2003) recognizes both these regimes, 
although he only models the supply constrained case. A novel result of our model is that we 
identify a third regime, with firm bargaining power between this lower and upper critical 
levels, where the bargaining outcome equals the ‘competitive’ solution, and changes in firm 
bargaining power does not affect wages and employment. This regime may occur for a 
                                                 
1 Since union members are also members of the electorate they can influence the decisions taken by politicians 
on the size of the public sector with a resulting increase in public sector employment as first suggested in the 
seminal paper by Courant et al. (1979) and further discussed in Babcock et al. (1997).  
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significant range of possible bargaining power parameter values, depending on the slope of 
the labor supply curve and the level of competitiveness in the product market. The fact that 
the model generates a highly nonlinear relationship between employment and firm bargaining 
power is consistent with the lack of evidence of negative union employment effects. 
  
The paper is organized as follows. The model and basic results are presented in Section 2, 
while Section 3 discusses the robustness of the results with regard to the union preferences. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
To investigate the relationship between bargaining outcomes and the relative bargaining 
power of the bargaining parties involved, we use a simple partial equilibrium model of wage 
bargaining between a trade union and a firm facing a less than perfectly elastic labor supply 
curve.  
 
Worker preferences 
When the labor supply curve to the firm is upward sloping, workers must be heterogeneous in 
some aspect. As Bulkley and Myles (2001), we will assume that the workers have equal 
productivity, while the utility from alternative employment differs across workers. Variation 
in the utility level in alternative employment may be due to differences in mobility costs, 
differences in the connections to the firms, differences in the propensity to be unemployed, or 
different information level across workers. 
 
Assuming that the workers are risk neutral, the utility level can be represented by their income 
level. We assume that the alternative income of potential workers in a particular firm is 
uniformly distributed on support L HA ,A⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  with density H L1A A− . Then the labor supply 
function faced by the firm is given by the cumulative distribution of the alternative income 
times the number of potential workers, L. 
( )S LN W A= φ −   (1) 
where H LLA A−φ = . This is a simple linear supply schedule with slope φ due to worker 
heterogeneity. 
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Trade union preferences 
In this section we will rely on the utilitarian approach that has been common in the literature, 
see for example McDonald and Solow (1981). Within this approach, the union cares about 
both wages and employment. This is in accordance with existing empirical studies on union 
preferences, see Clark and Oswald (1993) and the overview in Pencavel (1991). Alternative 
utility functions are discussed in Section 3.  
 
We initially assume that union membership is equal to the number of potential workers, L. 
Assume that in the case of excess supply, the number of workers employed in the firm, 
denoted N, is a random draw of the workers who want to work in the firm. With risk 
neutrality, the expected utility level of a randomly chosen worker i can be written  
S L S H
i
N N N W A L N A WU W
L L 2 L 2
− + − += + +  (2) 
The first part of the expression is the probability of employment in the firm times the utility 
level in that case. The second term is the probability of not being employed in the firm even 
though the worker wants to be employed in the firm (there is excess supply) times the 
expected utility level. The last term of the expression is the probability that the worker do not 
want to be employed in the firm times expected utility.  
 
Collecting terms and utilizing (1), (2)can be written 
L L H
i
N W A A AU
L 2 2
− += +   (3) 
The first term in (3) is the expected utility gain for the workers in the firm while the second 
term is the expected outside utility level for the union members. In order to use a Nash 
bargaining solution, we also need to specify the utility level during a dispute in the bargaining 
process. Assuming that a dispute in the wage bargaining implies N = 0 and that the union 
members get their alternative income, the net union utility in utilitarian terms is 
L L H L H LL L
0
i 1 i 1
N W A A A A A W AU U N
L 2 2 2 2= =
⎛ ⎞− + + −− = + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (4) 
This utility function is qualitatively equal to the traditional rent maximizing formulation. The 
union maximizes total rent in expectation terms. Notice that membership size L is not 
included in (4). Thus, the interpretation of L is not important for the model. One may think of 
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L as (i) a large number, (ii) the number of workers in the firm when supply equals demand as 
in Bulkley and Myles (2001), or (iii) as the supply of labor faced by the firm2.  
 
Competitive solution 
Turning to the firm, assume that employment is the only input and R(N), 
( ) ( )R N 0, R N 0′ ′′> < , is the revenue function. The profit is ( )R N WNΠ = − , and the labor 
demand function is given by 
( )DR N W′ =   (5) 
Upper letter D indicates that the outcome is on the demand curve. Define W* and N* as the 
wage and employment for which supply equals demand. Equalizing (1) and (5) gives the 
competitive solution as 
( )( ) ( )* * L *W R W A R N′ ′= φ − = .  (6) 
 
Wage bargaining 
We follow the tradition in the wage bargaining literature by using a ‘right to manage’ model 
where employment is determined after the wage bargaining.3 The bargaining outcome is 
illustrated by the Nash bargaining solution,  
( ) ( )( )10 0
W
argmax U U
γ −γΠ −Π −   (7) 
where γ and (1–γ) are the relative bargaining powers of the firm and the union, respectively, 
and Π0 is the profit during a dispute. Since we assume that N = 0 during a dispute, 0 0Π = . 
The bargaining solution is given by the first order condition to the Nash product  
( ) 0W U W1 0U U
∂Π ∂ ∂ ∂γ + − γ =Π − .  (8) 
 
To illustrate the range of possible outcomes of the model it is instructive to use Figure 1 
where Π1, Π2 and Π3 denotes isoprofit curves and U1, U2 and U3 denotes union indifference 
curves. The monopsony solution is at point A at the tangency of an isoprofit curve and the 
labor supply curve, and the monopoly union solution is at point B at the tangency of a union 
                                                 
2 Notice that the expected income of a randomly chosen union member during a conflict in the case where union 
membership is equal to labor supply is (W+AL)/2. Equivalently, when union membership is equal to 
employment when labor supply equals labor demand, the expected income is (W*+AL)/2, where W* is the wage 
for which demand equals supply. 
3 This implicitly implies that employment is more flexible than wages, which, however, is not a universal 
assumption, see for example Grout (1984) and Falch (2001a). 
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indifference curve and labor demand. Point C illustrates the competitive solution with W = 
W* and N = N*. Initially, two regimes may be identified. First, in the traditional case the 
outcome is on the labor demand curve, which we will denote REGIME 1. In this case the 
outcome moves towards point B as γ approaches zero. An outcome on the labor supply curve 
will be denoted REGIME 2. As γ approaches unity, the outcome moves towards point A. We 
now characterize these regimes in more detail and investigate the possibility of moving 
between the regimes as the relative bargaining power of the firm changes. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
REGIME 1. The demand constrained case 
Consider the case when W > W* and (5) holds. Define ( ) ( )NR NR N′κ =  as the revenue 
elasticity with respect to employment and ( ) ( )NR NR N 0′′′ε = <  as the elasticity of the marginal 
revenue with respect to employment. The wage outcome can then be written 
( )( )
( )( )( )D L
1 1
W A 1
1 1 1
⎛ ⎞− γ − κ ε= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟γκε − − γ − κ + ε⎝ ⎠
  (9) 
An internal solution requires that κ ≤ 1. In traditional union models, the bargained wage is a 
mark-up over the alternative wage. In the present model, the wage is a mark-up over the 
alternative wage of the worker with the lowest alternative wage, AL.  
 
REGIME 2. The supply constrained case 
Obviously, the outcome in (9) with the corresponding employment level in (5) is not feasible 
when the implied wage is less than the competitive wage, W*, and excess demand occurs. To 
see what happens, consider the case when γ is sufficiently large to generate a solution with 
W< W*. In this case the firm is constrained by the supply curve and the bargaining solution 
(8) can be written 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
L
L
R N W dN dW N N W A dN dW
1 0
R WN N W A
′ − − + −γ + − γ =− −  (10) 
where dN dW = φ and ( )R N W′ > . Collecting terms yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )S L MR N R N1 1W A 1 W 1
2 N 2 N
⎛ ⎞= γ + − γ + γκ = γ + − γ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (11) 
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where ( )( )M L12W R N A′= +  is the monopsony wage, and ( )R N N W≥  in order for Π ≥ 0. 
Upper letter S indicates that the outcome is on the supply curve. In this case, the bargained 
wage is an average of the monopsony wage and the zero-profit wage, weighted by the 
bargaining powers. 
 
The following proposition compares demand and supply constrained cases, characterized by 
(9) and (11), respectively. 
 
Proposition 1 
( )
( ) ( )
−= − + −
*
* * L1
2
1 WˆDefine
1 W W A
κγ κ κ   (12) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
− − += − − + − −
L *
L * * L
1 A 1 W
and .
1 A 1 W W A
κ εγ κ ε κε  (13) 
(i) For ∂ ∂< > < >∂ ∂
* W Nˆ , W W , 0, 0.γ γ γ γ  
(ii) For ∂ ∂> < < >∂ ∂
* W N, W W , 0, 0.γ γ γ γ   
 
Proof: γˆ  is the value of γ for which the bargained wage in Regime 1 is equal to the 
competitive wage, W*, calculated utilizing (9) and (6). Below this critical value the wage 
(employment) is decreasing (increasing) in firm bargaining power. Correspondingly, γ  is the 
value of γ for which the bargained wage in Regime 2 is equal to W*, calculated utilizing (11) 
and (6). Above this critical value both the wage and employment are decreasing in firm 
bargaining power.  
 
Proposition 1 implies that the effect of bargaining power is discontinuous. Starting from an 
initial point where the firm’s bargaining power is at its maximum (γ = 1), i.e. at point A in 
Figure 1, a marginal decrease in firm bargaining power increases the employment as the 
outcome moves up the supply curve in the supply constrained case. Next, consider the 
opposite case, where the initial position is at the point where the firm’s bargaining power is at 
its minimum, (γ = 0), i.e. at point B in Figure 1. In this case a marginal increase in the firm’s 
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bargaining power increases employment as the outcome moves down the demand curve in 
demand constrained case. 
 
REGIME 3. The quasi-competitive case 
To give a more complete characterization of the discontinuity, the next proposition compares 
the two critical values of the bargaining power, γˆ  and γ . 
 
Proposition 2:  
(i) > γˆ γ  
(ii) For ∂ ∂≥ ≥ = =∂ ∂
W Nˆ , 0γ γ γ γ γ . 
 
Proof: From Proposition 1 it follows that γˆ > γ  if  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2* * L L * L * L1 W 2 W A A W A 1 W A 0− ε − − ε + = − − ε − >  (14) 
This is always fulfilled with strict inequality because W* > AL and ε < 0, proves part (i) of the 
proposition. Part (ii) of the proposition follows from the fact that for γˆ ≥ γ ≥ γ , WD < W* and 
ND > NS, which is an impossible solution, and WS > W* and NS > ND, which also is an 
impossible solution. Increased bargaining power of the firm cannot result in decreased wage 
and employment along the demand schedule, and increased bargaining power of the union 
cannot result in increased wage and employment along the supply schedule. Thus, nothing 
happens when the bargaining power changes within the interval γˆ ≥ γ ≥ γ .  
 
To explain the intuition behind this result, consider a gradual increase in the bargaining power 
of the firm from the situation where the firm has no power (γ = 0), i.e., the monopoly union 
solution. In this demand-constrained case, the outcome moves down the demand schedule 
until the wage reaches W* from above. The union is forced to accept a lower wage, but gain 
higher employment, although the union utility level is reduced. When the wage reaches W = 
W*, the firm react to a further reduction in the wage by reducing the employment because it is 
now constrained by the labor supply curve. Thus the union loses both in terms of wage and 
employment, and the marginal loss of the union makes a jump upwards.  
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Figure 2 illustrates the bargaining solution (8) with the relative union utility change and the 
bargaining power weighted relative profit change with respect to wages, ( ) ( )0U W U U∂ ∂ −  
and ( ) ( )( )W 1−γ ∂Π ∂ − γ Π , respectively, on the vertical axes and the wage level on the 
horizontal axes. At the bargaining solution, the wage is such that the quantities on the vertical 
axes are equal. As to the slope of the curves, the relative increase in union utility with respect 
to wages is decreasing in the wage level. On the other hand, the slope of the absolute value of 
the relative profit change with respect to wages may differ between the bargaining regimes. It 
is increasing in the wage level when the outcome is supply constrained, while the effect of 
increased wage has in general an ambiguous sign when the outcome is demand constrained. In 
Figure it is drawn with a negative slope to the right of W* and consistent with the second 
order condition for a bargaining solution. It is important to notice that while the curve 
representing the relationship between ( ) ( )( )W 1−γ ∂Π ∂ − γ Π  and W is continuous because 
the slope of the isoprofit curve is equal to zero when W = W* and N = N*, this is not the case 
for the curve representing the relationship between ( ) ( )0U W U U∂ ∂ −  and W. At W=W* 
the relative utility gain from a further wage increase makes a downward discrete jump since a 
wage increase now implies the conventional employment loss since the union will be 
constrained by the labor demand curve. In Figure 2, the bargaining power weighted change in 
relative profits is drawn for the two critical levels of the bargaining power. When the wage 
reaches W* from above, and ˆγ = γ , a marginal increase in γ is not enough to further reduce the 
wage. For γˆ ≥ γ ≥ γ , marginal changes in the bargaining power do not alter the bargaining 
outcome; both the wage and employment is independent of marginal changes in γ. Only if 
firm bargaining power is increased to the next critical level, γ = γ , a marginal reduction in γ 
again reduces the wage as the supply-constrained case now applies. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The relationship between employment and the bargaining power of the firm implied by 
Propositions 1 and 2 is presented in Figure 3, where A and B is the monopsony and monopoly 
union solutions, respectively. How relevant is the case where changes in the bargaining power 
have no effect? Within the present setup, the factors influencing the relevance of the quasi-
competitive case are the competitiveness of the labor and product markets. In addition, union 
objectives are important as discussed in the next section. Here we first look at the marginal 
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effects of changes in the competitiveness of the labor and product markets, and thereafter we 
undertake a simple numerical illustration. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Assume that product demand is X kP−η=  and the technology is simply X = N, i.e. the 
revenue function is given by ( ) ( ) ( )R N P X X N kNκ= = , where ( ) ]11 0,1−κ = −η ∈  is a 
constant and can be interpreted as a measure of product market competitiveness. In this case, 
ε = κ–1.  
 
The probability that the quasi-competitive case will occur is related to γˆ − γ . From (12) and 
(13)  it follows that  
( )
( )
( )
( )
* L * L1 1
2 2
L * L1 1
2 2
W A 1 W A
ˆ
1 A 1 W A
κ − − κ −γ − γ = − κ − κ − κ   (15) 
Obviously, changing the demand and supply parameters in (6) changes the competitive wage 
W*. Here we evaluate the effect of changes in φ and κ while keeping W* constant, i.e., we 
analyze the effect on γˆ − γ  for given wage in the quasi-competitive case. For labor supply this 
is done by changing φ via changes in AH–AL. It follows from (15) that reduced market power 
for the firm in the labor market, that is decreased φ measured by a rise in AL, has a negative 
effect on γˆ − γ .4  At the margin where φ = 0, the traditional union model applies, and the 
quasi-competitive regime is not relevant. 
 
To evaluate the effect of reduced market power of the firm in the product market, we change 
the constant term k in the production function along with changes in κ in order to keep W* 
fixed. The marginal effect is simply found by the derivative of (15) with respect to κ for given 
W*. The effect is positive; Increased competitiveness increases γˆ − γ . This is partly due to the 
fact that the negative effect on profit of increased employment becomes smaller when the 
price of the product is less sensitive to output. 
 
                                                 
4 Alternatively this effect could be evaluated by reducing the number of potential workers L to the firm. From (6) 
this will increase the competitive wage W*, which in turn has a positive effect on γˆ = γ  from (15). 
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In order to illustrate the potential importance of the quasi-competitive case, Figure 4 presents 
the relationship between γˆ − γ  and κ for two different labor supply curves.5 As evident from 
(15), γˆ − γ  is increasing in κ. This is because as κ increases, γ  is reduced more than γˆ . For 
plausible market powers in the product market, the quasi-competitive case is important. When 
κ = 0.6 and the wage mark-up over the alternative wage for the worker with the lowest 
alternative wage (W* - AL) is equal to 0.2 , W = W* for relative bargaining power of the firm 
in the range 0.70–0.89. By reducing AL such that (W* - AL) increases to 0.4, W = W* for 
relative bargaining power of the firm in the range 0.25–0.80.6 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Notice that under some conditions, the outcome may never be demand-constrained because 
W* may be equal to the monopoly union wage.7 On the other hand, when relative bargaining 
power of the firm is close to unity, the outcome will always be supply-constrained as long as 
φ has a finite value, i.e., as long as the firm has some market power in the labor market. In this 
case, the outcome will be W = W* for some range of γ.  
 
 
3. Alternative union utility functions 
   
To check the generality of our results we now investigate how the model results depend on 
the formulation of union preferences. The relative weight the union put on the wage compared 
to the employment can be described by the concavity of the utility function with respect to the 
wage relative to the concavity of the utility function with respect to employment. Several 
                                                 
5 We would ideally like to use empirical estimates of the slope of the labor supply schedule, represented by φ, in 
the numerical experiments. However, as noted by Manning (2003), there exist few estimates of this parameter. 
Two studies using exogenous wage variation, Staiger et al. (1999) and Falch (2001b), find different results. 
While Staiger et al. find a supply elasticity for nurses in Veteran Administrated hospitals of 0.1, Falch finds an 
elasticity of unity for teachers. Some studies have used an indirect approach by calculating the monopsony 
power of the firms. When using estimated parameters from an equilibrium search model, van den Berg and 
Ridder (1998) calculate the monopsony power to be in the range 0.10-0.17, which is equal to the inverse of the 
supply elasticity, see Boal and Ransom (1997).  It seems fair to conclude that the evidence on the slope of the 
labor supply function is rather mixed. In our setup, the labor supply elasticity at W = W* depends on the constant 
term in the production function because AH are scaled to secure a given W*.  
6 There exist few empirical estimates of the value of γ. Svejnar (1986) estimates union bargaining power 1–γ in 
the range 0.06 to 0.72 for different US companies. Using data on men in Australia, McDonald and Suen (1992) 
estimate 1–γ to the range 0.4 to 0.5 over the period 1966–1989. 
7 This is easy to see in the extreme case with perfect competition in the product market (ε = κ = 1) for which the 
labor demand is flat and the monopoly union solution is equal to the competitive solution.  
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alternative formulations of the union utility function are specified in the literature. McDonald 
and Solow (1981) assume that the utility function of each worker is concave in the wage level. 
With such a formulation, the union utility function is more heavily weighted against 
employment than implied by (4).  
 
One important feature of the union utility function used above is that the union care about the 
utility level of workers not employed in the firm. The number of union members employed 
outside the firm has no effect on the outcome, but there must be some union members 
employed outside the firm in order for the union to care about employment as long as 
employment is not shrinking. Layard et al. (1991) make the assumption that insiders do not 
care about the well-being of workers outside the firm, but assume instead that they care about 
the probability of being laid off. Because the probability of reemployment depends on 
expected change in employment, the workers implicitly care about employment, but the union 
preferences is more heavily weighted against wages than implied by (4). The consequences of 
union utility more heavily weighted against wages than implied by our initial assumptions can 
be investigated by a simple reformulation of the union utility function.  
 
We assumed above that workers employed by the firm are a random draw from the pool of 
workers with an alternative income below W. In practice, rules like ‘last in - first out’ (LIFO) 
may question this assumption. Consider instead a case where the firm has gradually expanded 
to the present size, along the supply curve, which means that seniority is a negative function 
of the alternative wage. With a LIFO rule, the worker with the highest alternative wage is 
firstly laid off if the firm decreases employment. In this case the union utility function is 
( ) ( )S HL S Si
i 1
W W A WU U NW N N L N
2 2=
+ += = + − + −∑  (16) 
WS is the lowest wage necessary to employ N workers. On the labor supply curve, WS = W, 
while on the labor demand curve, WS < W. It is easy to show that indifference curves 
corresponding to (16) are flat just where they meet the supply curve. The reason is that on the 
supply curve, the next worker hired is paid his opportunity wage and the first worker laid off 
can get the same wage in alternative employment. The relevant measure in wage bargaining, 
however, is the net union utility. 
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( ) ( )S L S H0 S S
S L
0 L
W A W W A WU N N N L N ,
2 2 2
2W W A NU U N N W A .
2 2
+ + += + − + −
⎛ ⎞− −− = = − −⎜ ⎟φ⎝ ⎠
 (17) 
By inserting (1) into (17), it is easily seen that on the supply curve the net union utility (17) is 
equal to (4). Thus, the bargaining outcome in the supply–constrained case is independent of 
whether a LIFO rule is taken into account in the formulation of the union preferences. 
 
In the demand-constrained case, N < NS, the wage outcome will be larger under a LIFO rule 
than in the random case because the net union utility function (17) is more heavily weighted 
against wages than (4). For given bargaining power, the wage in the demand-constrained case 
(REGIME 1) will be higher, which implies that γˆ  will be smaller, i.e., the range of γ for 
which W = W* is lower.  
  
Oswald (1993) introduces an extreme version of the union utility function under the LIFO 
principle. He argues that the median worker in terms of tenure is the decisive union member, 
and in most cases the probability of layoff for the median member is small and negligible. 
Assuming that the decisive member of the union has an alternative wage equal to 
( ) LW 1 Aδ + − δ , where 0 < δ < 1 describes the position of the decisive member in the 
distribution of the alternative wage, the revealed preferences of the union are 
( )( )0 LU U 1 W A− = −δ −                     (18) 
When the union does not care about employment, the indifference curves are flat, and there is 
no discontinuity in the marginal union utility for W = W*. Now the bargaining outcome will 
be continuous in γ. 
 
Proposition 3 
When the union utility function is given by (18) 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1
−= = = − + − 
*
* * L
Wˆˆ
W W A
κγ γ γ κ κ   (19) 
                        
Proof: With the utility function (18), the wages under the demand and supply constrained 
cases are 
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( )( )
( )( )D L
1 1
W A 1
1 1
⎛ ⎞− γ − κ= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟γκ − − γ − κ⎝ ⎠
  (20) 
and 
( ) ( )S L R N 1W A ,
1 N 1
− γ + γκγ= ++ γ + γ   (21) 
respectively. For W = W*, implying ( ) *R N W′ = , manipulation of (20) and (21) yields (19).  
 
In contrast to the case with a rent maximizing union considered in Proposition 1 and 2, there 
exist only one value of firm bargaining power, γˆ , for which the bargaining outcome equals 
the competitive solution.8 Notice further that γˆ  has an intermediate value compared to γˆ  and 
γ . Compared to the rent maximizing union, the range of values of the bargaining power for 
which the outcome is supply constrained (REGIME 2) is larger because the union gain of a 
wage increase is lower (does not value higher employment), and the range of values of the 
bargaining power for which the outcome is demand constrained is larger because the union 
gain of a wage increase is higher (does not care about lower employment).  
 
The assumption that the union does not care about the employment level must be considered 
as an extreme specification of union preferences. Appendix A proves that as long as the union 
to some extend care of the employment level, Propositions 1 and 2 holds and there will be 
some range of the bargaining power for which W = W*. 
 
 
4. Conclusion. 
 
In this paper we have developed a simple model of wage bargaining between a union and a 
firm facing an upward sloping labor supply curve to analyze how changes in the relative 
bargaining power of the union and the firm alter the bargaining outcome. Starting from the 
monopoly union case with zero bargaining power of the firm, increased firm bargaining 
power reduces the wage and increases the employment along the labor demand curve until 
labor demand equals labor supply. A further increase in firm bargaining power does not affect 
the wage and employment at the margin. The ‘competitive’ solution applies for a range of 
                                                 
8 It follows from (20) and (21) that, evaluated for W = W*, the marginal effect of γ is equal in the supply and 
demand constrained cases. 
 15
values of the relative bargaining power. Only when the firm bargaining power exceeds a 
certain critical value, increased firm bargaining power decreases the wage (and employment) 
along the labor supply curve, and in the limit the pure monopsony solution applies. The 
likelihood of the intermediate (quasi-competitive) case increases as the market powers of the 
firm in the product and labor markets decline, and if the union objectives get more weighted 
against employment relative to wages. 
 
The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between relative bargaining power and 
employment. As the relative firm bargaining power increases from zero to unity, the 
employment firstly increases, then stays constant, and finally decreases. Thus, the model 
offers one explanation of the inconclusiveness regarding the union employment effects often 
found in empirical work. Our model suggests that when estimating the effect of unions on 
employment it is important to take into account whether the firm has some market power in 
the labor market.  
 
The model shows that union influence may be efficient enhancing when firms have market 
power in the labor market because the wage then may be closer to the marginal revenue 
product of labor than when unions are absent. In fact, bargaining power in the hands of trade 
unions may secure efficiency because ‘medium’ powerful unions may secure an outcome 
where demand equals supply, where ‘medium’ powerful does not imply a certain level of the 
union bargaining power but a range of different bargaining powers. An important caveat, 
however, is that this conclusion is based on a partial analysis, in future work this should be 
more closely analyzed within a general equilibrium model. 
 
 16
Appendix A. Flexible union utility function 
The union potentially cares about the wage and employment levels. The functional form of 
the utility function is in general unknown, and in this appendix we simply assume that the net 
union utility is given by 
0U U u(W, N)− = .                   (A.1) 
Based on (A.1) and (8), the bargaining outcome in the demand and supply constrained cases, 
respectively, can be written 
( )( )
( )( )D NW
1 1
1 1
γκε − − γ − κ ψψ = − γ − εκ ε   (A.2) 
( )( ) ( )
( )
L
S A 1 R N NW
2 1
γ + γκ + − γ Ω= γ + − γ Ω   (A.3) 
 
where 
( )
( )
( )
( )
L
W N W N
u W, N u W, NW N W A, , and
W u W, N N u W, N W
∂ ∂ −ψ = ψ = Ω = ψ +ψ∂ ∂  (A.4) 
 
(A.2) and (A.3) yields 
( )
( ) ( )
*
* * L
1 Wˆ ,
1 W W A
− κ Ωγ = − κ Ω+ κ −   (A.5) 
( )( )
( )( )W NW N
1
1
− κ εψ +ψγ = − κ εψ +ψ + κε   (A.6) 
 
For ( )LW W W Aψ = −  and N 1ψ = , as for the rent maximizing union utility function (4), 
these expressions are equal to the expressions in Proposition 1. It follows that γˆ ≥ γ  if 
( )( )* LN 1 W A 0,ψ −ε − ≥   (A.7) 
which holds with strict inequality if Nψ  is strictly positive, while for N 0ψ = , the expression 
holds with equality. Thus, as long as the union care about employment, there will be some 
range of γ for which W = W*.  
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Figure 1. Isoprofit and indifference curves 
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Figure 2. The bargaining solution. 
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Figure 3: Employment and the bargaining power of the firm 
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Figure 4. The relationship between γˆ − γ  and κ. W* = 1.2, and AL = 1 or AL = 0.8. 
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In Proposition 1 of the Working Paper, the definitions of the critical bargaining powers of the 
firm, γˆ  and γ , have been interchanged. The correct definitions read 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
L *
L * * L
1 A 1 W
ˆ
1 A 1 W W A
− κ − + εγ = − κ − + ε − κε −   
and  
( )
( ) ( )
*
* * L1
2
1 W
.
1 W W A
− κγ = − κ + κ −   
 
The rest of Proposition 1 is correct.  
 
The misprint regarding γˆ  and γ  has turned Proposition 2 around. The correct Proposition 2 
reads  
 
Proposition 2:  
(i) < γˆ γ  
(ii) For ∂ ∂≤ ≤ = =∂ ∂
W Nˆ , 0.γ γ γ γ γ  
 
For the Cobb Douglas specification of product demand, equation (15) reads 
( )
( )
( )
( )
* L * L1 1
2 2
L * L1 1
2 2
W A 1 W A
ˆ
1 A 1 W A
κ − − κ −γ − γ = − κ − κ − κ  
The numerical example in Figure 4 is correct, except that the figure presents the relationship 
between ˆγ − γ  and κ instead of γˆ − γ  and κ. 
 
Detailed derivation of the results is available at 
http://www.sv.ntnu.no/iso/torberg.falch/nettsider/Paper/Lagrangian.pdf 
